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Hartley: Application of the New Generation-Skipping Tax to Life Insurance

NOTES
APPLICATION OF THE NEW GENERATION-SKIPPING TAX
TO LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS:
A HEADACHE FOR EVERYONE INVOLVED*
INTRODUCTION

In its continuing effort to redistribute wealth and to get its finger in the pie,
the federal government has recently enacted the new tax on generation-skipping
transfers - Chapter 13 of the Internal Revenue Code., One purpose of the tax
is to extract a fair share for government and to discourage wealth accumulation
in arrangements that transfer wealth from generation to generation and that
under past law have escaped transfer taxes.2 The purpose stated in committee
reports is to equalize tax treatment among the economic classes of Americans
through elimination of the generation-skipping trust which allowed wealthier
individuals to escape estate taxes. 3 While such trusts were theoretically available to all individuals, only those with substantial wealth would have the
requisite funds to establish a trust providing benefits to more than one generation of beneficiaries. Hence, the wealthy were able to escape several generations
of estate taxes while other economic classes were subject to these taxes each
generation. The motivation that runs throughout the chapter is that wealth
4
should be taxed once for each generation that has enjoyed its benefit. Under
current estate and gift tax law, the corpus of a trust which provides for a life
interest in a son with remainder to his children will be taxed once upon the
establishment of the trust and then not again until the death of the son's
children. At the death of the son no estate tax will be imposed since there was
no interest in the son's estate to be taxed.5 The son's generation of wealth
EDITOR'S NOTE: This note was awarded the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
as the outstanding note submitted by a Senior Candidate in the Winter 1978 quarter.
1. I.R.C. §§2601-2622.
2. See Stephens & Calfee, Skip to M'Loo, 32 TAX. L. REV. 443, 448 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Stephens & Calfee] for a discussion of the federal government's continuing effort to
tax wealth transfers.
3. Although the tax advantages of generation-skipping trusts are available to all, it is
only the wealthy who may practically take advantage of them since they are the only ones
whose wealth will create enough interest income to make a generation-skipping trust worthwhile. Recognizing the inequities in application of the tax advantage and also recognizing
that the effect of escaping tax for a generation defeats the progressive nature of federal taxes
for which Congress strives, legislators felt a change of law was warranted. H.R. REP. No.
94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 735 [herinafter cited as H.R. REP.].
4. "The tax is to be substantially equivalent to the estate tax which would have been
imposed if the property had been actually transferred outright to each successive generation."
Id.
5. "[T]he mere termination of
other than that which terminated,
termination was accompanied by a
supra note 2, at 449. When the life

a person's interest in property, if he never had an interest
was invariably viewed as a tax nullity, even though the
shift of a present interest to another." Stephens & Calfee,
tenant dies his interest is extinguished leaving nothing to
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enjoyment escapes taxation through the use of the trust. 6 Such an arrangement
is the simplest form of generation-skipping trusts addressed by the new taxing
statute. Under the new law, a generation-skipping tax may be imposed at the
death of the son.
The new transfer tax7 is designed to apply to all generation-skipping trusts"
including "trust equivalents."9 Life insurance and annuities are examples of
arrangements that are specifically included within the statute's trust equivalent
definition. 10 This note will examine the kinds of life insurance and annuity
contracts that may be classified as trust equivalents. In addition, an examination will be made of how the tax may be applied in those cases.
Following an analysis of the new law, the types of insurance arrangements
that are most likely to be affected by the tax will be examined. Special emphasis will be placed on those problems that will likely be encountered in
trying to administer the new tax from the viewpoint of both the insurance
company and the beneficiary.
THE NEW GENERATION-SKIPPING LAW

Before applicability of the new law to insurance arrangements can be understood, an overview is essential. As indicated above, the new taxing scheme
applies only to generation-skipping trusts and trust equivalents. Since inpass as part of his estate. The interest of the remainderman is deemed to pass from the
grantor of the trust itself. See, e.g., Keeter v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 1093, 1971-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 112,759 (N.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 461 F.2d 714, 1972-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
112,759 (5th Cir. 1972); Estate of Wittman v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 119,054 (1952);
Estate of Schwartz v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 115,621 (1947).
6. If the trust vehicle had not been used, the assets would have passed to the son outright. The assets would then be included in the son's gross estate to whatever extent they
were not consumed during his life. See I.R.C. §2033.
7. "A tax is . . . imposed on every generation-skipping transfer." I.R.C. §2601. "The
amount of the tax imposed.. . shall be the excess of (1) a tentative tax computed in accordance with the rate schedule set forth in section
2001(c) (as in effect on the date of transfer) on the sum of(A) the fair market value of the property transferred determined as of the date of
transfer (or in the case of an election under subsection (d), as of the applicable valuation date prescribed by section 2032),
(B) the aggregate fair market value (determined for purposes of this chapter) of
all prior transfers of the deemed transferor to which this chapter applied,
(C) the amount of the adjusted taxable gifts (within the meaning of section
2001(b)) made by the deemed transferor before this transfer, and
(D) if the deemed transferor has died at the same time as, or before, this transfer,
the taxable estate of the deemed transferor, over
'(2) a tenative tax (similarly computed) on the sum of the amounts determined under
subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) of paragraph (1)." I.R.C. §2602.
8. "The term 'generation-skipping trust' means any trust having younger generation
beneficiaries . . . who are assigned to more than one generation." I.R.C. §2611(b). See text
accompanying notes 11-14 infra.
9. I.R.C. §2611(d)(1) defines trust equivalents as arrangements which "although not a
trust, [have] substantially the same effect as a generation-skipping trust."
10. "Arrangements to be taken into account... include (but are not limited to) arrange.
ments involving life estates and remainders, estates for years, insurance and annuities, and
split interests." I.R.C. §2611(d)(2). See note 58 infra.
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surance will only qualify as a trust equivalent when it has substantially the
same effect as a generation-skipping trust, it is essential that the basic term be
understood. The law itself defines a generation-skipping trust as "any trust
having younger generation beneficiaries.., who are assigned to more than one
generation.""1 Anyone who possesses a present or future interest 12 in a
generation-skipping trust is a younger generation beneficiary if he is assigned
to a generation that is at least one generation younger 1 3 than the grantor.' 4 For
example, a trust in which the grantor's son has a life estate with the remainder
going to the grantor's grandchildren would have as younger generation beneficiaries both the son and grandchildren. Each is in younger generations than
the grantor and each has a present or future interest in the trust. Once it is
determined that a generation-skipping trust or trust equivalent is involved, it
becomes necessary to examine the events that will trigger a tax. There are two
such events listed in the statute: the taxable distribution, 1 and the taxable
termination.' 6
II. I.R.C. §2611(b). For example, a trust in which the only two beneficiaries are the son
and grandson of the grantor would meet this younger generation beneficiary test; each beneficiary belongs to a different generation that is younger than that of the grantor.
12. "The term 'beneficiary' means any person who has a present or future interest or
power in the trust." I.R.C. §2613(c)(3). The statute defines a person having an interest as
either a person who has the "right to receive income or corpus from the trust" or "a permismisible recipient of such income or corpus." Id. §2613(d)(1). A power is described as the
ability to "establish or alter beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or income of the trust." Id.

§2613(d)(2).
13. I.R.C. §2613(c)(1). A beneficiary is assigned a generation by virtue of his family relationship to the grantor. H.R. REp., supra note 3, at 48. The basic rule for related beneficiaries,
whether related by the half blood (I.R.C. §2611 (c)(3)) or by legal adoption (I.R.C. §2611 (c)(4)),
is to look to the natural family generation pattern. "[Ain individual who is a lineal descendant
of a grandparent of the grantor shall be assigned to that generation which results from comparing the number of generations between the grandparent and such individual with the
number of generations between the grandparent and the grantor." I.R.C. §2611(c)(1). Grandparents, parents, brothers and sisters and first cousins of the grantor will never belong to a
generation younger than the grantor so they could never be younger generation beneficiaries.
Spouses are assigned to the same generation as their related spouse, regardless of age, so
spouses of the above named persons would also never be younger generation beneficiaries.
Children, nephews and second cousins of the grantor would be in the first generation of
younger generation beneficiaries while grandchildren, grand nephews, and third cousins would
be second younger generation.
For beneficiaries outside the family, the generation level changes every twenty-five years.
The first set of younger generation beneficiaries are those who are more than twelve and a
half years younger than the grantor but not more than thirty-seven and a half years younger.
See I.R.C. §2611(c)(5).
14. Nowhere in the statute is the term "grantor" defined. The house report gives some
guidance in stating that "a 'grantor' of the trust would include any person contributing or
adding property to the trust." H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 48. This would seem to be the
person who controls the original fund or adds to it. See text accompanying notes 75-94 infra.
15. Under I.R.C. §2601 a tax is imposed on generation-skipping transfers which are defined as "any taxable distribution or taxable termination with respect to a generation-skipping
trust or trust equivalent." I.R.C. §2611(a). For a discussion of what constitutes a taxable distribution see text accompanying notes 17-19 infra.
16. For a discussion of what constitutes a taxable termination see text accompanying notes
22-24 infra.
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A taxable distribution- occurs whenever trust funds other than income are
distributed to a younger generation beneficiary who is assigned to a generation
younger than that of another younger generation beneficiary with a present
interest or power 8s For instance, consider a trust to the grantor's son and
grandson. If during the son's life amounts out of the corpus of the trust are
paid to the grandson, a taxable distribution occurs at the time the payments
are made. Both the son and the grandson, who are members of different
younger generations, would be receiving present benefits in the same year and
amounts in excess of the trust income would have been paid out in that year.
Note, however, that section 2613(b)(6) of the code excepts from the generationskipping tax any transfer to grandchildren of the grantor up to $250,000 per
deemed transferor. The exception applies to both taxable terminations and
taxable distributions. For the purposes of this note, it will be assumed that the
grandchild exclusion is not applicable. As the above example indicates, in order
for a distribution to be taxable there must always be younger generation beneficiaries in at least two different generation levels, both of which have present
interests in the year of the distribution. The amount taxable as a distribution
will only be those amounts paid to the member of the younger beneficiary level
that exceed trust income for the year. 9 Whenever a taxable distribution occurs,
the distributee is liable for the tax imposed2O to the extent of the fair market
value of the distribution. 2'
The other event that triggers imposition of the tax is a "taxable termination."22 A "taxable termination" occurs whenever there is a termination of the
present interest or power of a younger generation beneficiary. The termination
will be taxable if the beneficiary whose interest has terminated is assigned to a
17. See text accompanying notes 112-131 infra.
18. I.R.C. §2613(a)(1).
19. Under §2613(a)(2), whenever distributions in any year are out of both income and
trust assets and two different generation levels of younger generation beneficiaries are receiving benefits, the income distributions, which are not a part of taxable distributions, will be
presumed to go first to the older level of beneficiaries. This provision prevents arbitrary assignment of labels to the distributions from being assigned to the older beneficiary; by designating
the grandson's benefit as being from income and the son's benefit as being from income and
corpus, the taxable distribution would be avoided altogether. See also text accompanying note
104 infra.
20. I.R.C. §2603(a)(1)(B). The liability of the distributee arises "[i]f the tax... is not paid,
when due." This wording suggests the possibility that someone else is primarily liable to pay
the tax. It may be expected in this situation that the trustee would withhold funds from the
distribution and pay the tax for the distributee. However, it should be noted that if the
trustee pays the tax out of the trust itself, the payment would constitute another taxable distribution. See I.1KC. §2613(a)(3).
21. I.R.C. §2603(a)(3). The fair market value is determined at the date of distribution. Id.
Until the tax is paid, a lien is placed upon the transferred property. I.R.C. §2603(b). In addition to paying the tax, the distributee has the duty of filing the tax return in the taxable
distribution. I.R.C. §2621(c)(1)(A).
22. In the event of a taxable termination and a taxable distribution resulting from the
same transaction, the statute creates a preference for taxable terminations. I.R.C. §2613(b)(7)(A).
For example, if property were distributed to a remainderman due to the termination of the
preceding life estate, the taxable distribuion will be ignored and the taxable termination will
be the taxable event. See text accompanying notes 165-175 infra.
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generation level higher than some other younger generation beneficiary.23 An
example would be the termination of the son's life estate when there are grandchildren with either present or future interests in the trust.2 4 The tax in a
taxable termination is the personal responsibility of the trustee. 25
The computation of the tax on all generation-skipping transfers is based
upon the fiction of a transfer of property from a deemed transferor.26 The
deemed transferor is frequently either the person whose interest has just terminated or the parent of the transfereeY Occasionally, however, the person
designated as the deemed transferor will be someone who never had any interest
in the trust at all.2s The law creates the fiction that the deemed transferor
participated in the transfer. This is done in order to obtain the maximum possible tax on the transfer through use of the deemed transferor's estate and gift
tax history. A tax on the distribution or termination amount alone might pro23. I.R.C. §2613(b)(1).
24. There are several statutory exceptions to the statutory definition of taxable terminations. Two of these deal with the situation when there is more than one current younger generation beneficiary receiving benefits under the generation-skipping trust. If the beneficiaries
are assigned to different generation levels and the younger generation beneficiary dies first, the
taxable termination will be postponed until the interests of the older generation beneficiaries
also terminate. I.R.C. §2613(b)(2)(C). At the death of the older beneficiary or at the termination of his interest, two taxes will be imposed.
If the beneficiaries are assigned to the same generation level, the taxable termination of
each beneficiary's interest will be postponed until the termination of the last interest held by
a beneficiary on that generation level. I.R.C. §2613(b)(2)(A); H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 37.
See also H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 50, 53. An exception to this second exception might occur
if the beneficiaries assigned to the same generation were deemed to have separate shares. See
text accompanying notes 97-106 infra.
25. I.R.C. §2603(a)(1)(B). Failure to pay the tax subjects the trustee to personal liability.
Once again, however, the statute phrases the trustee's liability as arising if the tax "is not paid,
when due." This raises the question of who is primarily liable to pay the tax. One would assume that the trustee is expected to pay the tax out of trust assets. A possible problem arises,
however, if the trustee has distributed the assets to a beneficiary before an audit or reassessment determines that additional tax is due. Such an additional tax could arise when a deemed
transferor dies within three years of the generation-skipping transfer. I.R.C. §2602(e). See note
32 infra. Since a lien for the tax is also imposed upon property transferred in a taxable termination (§2603(b)), it is conceivable that this additional liability will follow the property (and
not the trustee) when he no longer has possession of it.
The statute also limits the liability of the trustee by permitting him to ask for and rely
on rates from the Secretary. I.R.C. §2603(a)(2). See text accompanying notes 184-190 infra.
26. See Stephens & Calfee, supra note 2, at 510. "The deemed transferor is what it's all
about. In Cole Porter's words, he's 'The Top.' He is all over the place in Chapter 13. He has
proved it is not necessary to be a Baptist to be reborn; when physically dead he is fiscally
vigorous. Even when lacking in ectoplasm, he is more colorful than a mere Chapter 11 decedent or Chapter 12 donor. And, despite zero growth advocates, he is usually a parent -a
parent of a transferee- all as must now be told." Id. at 509. See also I.R.C. §§2602, 2621.
27. "Almost invariably, the deemed transferor in a taxable distribution or taxable termination is the parent of the transferee, and the parent more closely related to the grantor of
the trust than is the transferee's other parent. If neither parent is related to the grantor, the
deemed transferor is the parent who has the closer affinity to the grantor." Stephens &
Calfee, supra note 2, at 509, 510. See I.R.C. §2612.
28. I.R.C. §2612. See also Stephens & Calfee, supra note 2, at 511-13 for a discussion of
various unexpected possibilities and problems in identifying the deemed transferor.
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duce little or no tax at all since the tax rates are progressive and exempt from
tax the first $175,000 of the taxpayer's transfers.2 0 Therefore, a deemed transferor is presumed to have made the transfer being considered. This permits a
tax to be calculated on all the deemed transferor's estate and gift transfers.3o
Following this, another tax is figured using the sum of his estate and gift
transfers and the generation-skipping transfer. The difference between these
two taxes is the amount of tax imposed on the generation-skipping transfer. 31
Thus, to compute the tax on a generation-skipping transfer it is necessary to
32
determine not only who the deemed transferor is but also his tax history.
Finally, before it can be determined that a generation-skipping trust
equivalent exists in a life insurance or annuity contract, the effective dates and
grandfathering provisions of the tax must be examined. In general, the tax
3
will apply to any generation-skipping transfer made after April 30, 1976. 3
This rule is modified by several exceptions, including one that excepts transfers from trusts that were irrevocable on April 30, 1976, 34 and another that
excepts, until 1982, transfers from revocable trusts that were in existence on
April 30, 1976. As to revocable trusts, however, if they are amended after April
30, 1976, in any manner that creates or increases a generation-skipping transfer,
the tax will be invoked.35 As to any trust to which corpus is added after April
30, 1976, the amount of a generation-skipping transfer that is produced by
added corpus will be taxed.36
CHAPTER 13 APPLICATION TO INSURANCE

InsuranceArrangements as Trust Equivalents
In order for an insurance arrangement to be a generation-skipping trust
equivalent, there must be payments to two or more levels of younger generation beneficiaries. 37 In order for this to happen, practically speaking, the pro29. For decedents dying in 1977 through 1980 the statutory amounts are $120,000, $134,000,
$147,000, and $161,000 respectively. For decedents dying after 1980, returns will only be xequired of estates in excess of $175,000.
30. I.R.C. §2602(a). See note 7 supra. Computation of the tax also incorporates deductions
and credits for the deemed transferor's unused unified credit, marital deduction, charitable
deductions, etc. See I.R.C. §2602(c).
31. This method allows the generation-skipping transfer to be taxed at the maximum possible rate on the progressive rate table. The actual rate applied will be the rate at which the
deemed transferor's taxable transfers will be taxed.
32. I.R.C. §2602. In addition, in the case of a live deemed transferor, it will be necessary
to observe his health for three years after the transfer. If he dies within that period, the
transfer tax will be subject to recalculation. I.R.C. §2602(e). See text accompanying notes
169-170 and 191 infra.
Although the statute provides detailed description of the method of calculating the tax
rate, it also limits the liability of trustees who rely on rates furnished by the Secretary. I.R.C.
§2603(a)(2). See text accompanying notes 184-188 infra for a discussion of conceivable conflicts
that may arise in this area.
33. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, Tit. XX, §2006(c)(1), 90 Stat. 1520.
34. Id. §2006(c)(2)(A).

35. Id. §2006(c)(2)XB).
36. Id. §2006(c)(2). See text accompanying notes 65-68 infra.
37. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
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ceeds to be received from the insurance policy will necessarily be large.3 8
Otherwise, the insured or beneficiary probably would not choose the delayed
payout method. Whenever the amount of the proceeds is substantial the
bargaining power of the grantor with the insurance company naturally increases. 39 In addition, when a grantor must choose a method of payment of
large amounts of insurance proceeds and he feels the present value of those
proceeds exceeds the needs of the first beneficiary he is likely to choose an ar-

38. For example, under typical settlement option rates, beneficiaries would receive the
following monthly benefits:
Policy Proceeds
a) Interest only at 2-1/2%
Interest only at 5%
b) Life income 15 year certain 0

Male age 55
Male age 45

$50,000

$100,000

104/per mo.
208

208/per mo.
416

520/per mo.
1042

238
200

477
401

1192
1002

223
195

447
390

1117
975

306
279

613
558

1532
1396

264
255

528
509

1322
1273

$250,000

c) Life income 20 year certain*

Male age 55
Male age 45
d) 50% Joint & Survivor"
Male 55 & Female 35
Male 45 & Female 25
e) 100% Joint & Survivor"
Male 55 & Female 35
Male 45 & Female 25

*Assumptions used: 1937 Standard Annuity Table - calculated at 2-1/2% interest.
**Assumptions used: 1974 George B. Buck Mortality Table calculated at 6% Interest. Table
can be found in Toussaint and Driscoll, Note on a New Mortality Table
For Use in Pension Plans, 24 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF
ACTUARIES IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 320 (1974).

39. See generally, R. RIEGEL & J. MILLER, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES (5th ed.
1966) [hereinafter cited as RIECEL]; D. McGILL, TtE BENEFICIARY IN LIFE INSURANCE (rev. ed.
1956) [hereinafter cited as McGILL]. Riegel points out that insurance companies axe usually
more willing to tailor-make settlement plans for the insured than for the beneficiary. RIEGEL
at 185. McGill feels that companies will tailor-make any plan within reason but that they
generally limit the duration of the plan to the life of the widow and the maturity of the
children. In the non-family situation McGill states that companies tend to limit duration of
plans to the lives of the primary beneficiary and first contingent beneficiary. The method of
payment to the second contingent beneficiary will often be limited to a lump sum payout.
McGILL at 133. "Most life insurance companies will, in addition to the optional modes of
settlement offered in the contract, permit the election by the policyholder in advance of his
death, or by the beneficiary thereafter, of any reasonable and sound mode of settlement.
Many companies, further, will write special settlement agreements which they will attach to
make a part of the policy contract." R. MEHR & R. OSLER, MODERN LIFE INSURANCE 219 (3d
ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MEHR]. "[I]t is the practice of some companies to provide in
special settlement agreements that the options selected under them shall be the options, not
in the policy, but those in use by the company at the time the option goes into effect. A
number of observers question the ethics of this provision . . . [and] in at least some instances,
counsel of companies following the practice doubt not only the ethics of it but also the
legality." MEUR at 219 n. 33.
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rangement whereby payments will be spread out over more than one beneficiary, or even over more than one generation of beneficiaries. Due to the
substantial bargaining power of this type of grantor, insurance companies have
been more receptive to tailor-made settlement arrangements or the use of
standard options that fulfill the particular grantor's desires. Under these circumstances, it is possible that several arrangements currently exist in insurance
files which will fall within the generation-skipping trust equivalent category.
Equally likely is that some of these payout arrangements have been created
after April 30, 1976, the effective date of the new tax, since it is doubtful that
companies have changed their practices in the short time since its passage. The
result is that these policies may fall squarely within the ambit of the new tax
and the companies and beneficiaries may be forced to make appropriate adjustments.

Settlement Options
Trust equivalents arise most frequently from the various standard settlement options used in life insurance and annuity plans. 40 A choice between
these options is often guaranteed to the insured and the beneficiaries in the
policy itself. Therefore, in many instances companies now cannot alter existing
policies in any manner that will prevent exercise of the trust-creating options. 41
In order to understand how settlement options may create a trust equivalent
situation, it is necessary to examine the various options commonly offered. A
brief summary of the basic options is offered below.42 The reader should keep
in mind that companies offer a wide variety of variations and combinations of
these basic alternatives.
There are five commonly offered settlement options available in most

40.

A portion of payments under settlement options is currently taxed as gross income to

the recipient under I.R.C. §101(c) & (d). See 1 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON
§7.04 (1974 g. Supp. 1977) and W. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAW §25:2 (1972 &
Supp. 1976) [hereinafter cited as

MEYER]

for a discussion of the application of I.R.C. §101(c)

& (d).
41. While current figures on the percentage of policies electing distribution under settlement options are not readily available, past estimates place the percentage of ordinary life
policies electing delayed payment options at 18 to 25% of all policies. The largest percentage
of these appear to select the interest option. The following estimates have been published:

Method

MEHR

RIGEL

Lump sum
Life income
Annuity certain
Held at interest
Others

75%
no estimate
7%
11%
no estimate

82%
3%
6%
8%
1%

See MEHR, supra note 39, at 212-217; REGEL, supra note 39, at 185.
42. The descriptions presented are summarized from McGILL, supra note 39, at 116-118
and MEYER, supra note 40, at 384. See text accompanying notes 49-56 infra.
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policies:4 3 the lump sum, 44 interest, 45 life income, 46 time certain 4 7 and joint and
survivor options. 4 1 As the name of the lump sum option implies, all proceeds
under that alternative are distributed at one time. 49 Under an interest option
all proceeds of the policy are left with the insurance company and a guaranteed
rate of interest is paid to the beneficiary. In addition, the company may declare
additional interest each year in excess of the guaranteed rate. 50 Under the
interest option the beneficiary may also have the power to withdraw principal
in whole or in part. 51 At the death of the primary beneficiary, - the principal
is paid to a secondary beneficiary either in a lump sum or in any other optional payment arrangement.53
Under the life income option, equal installments are paid periodically to
the beneficiary for life. The payments consist of part principal and part in5 4
terest. Death of the beneficiary terminates all payments.
43. For sample language used in policies offering settlement options see S. HUEBNER &
K. BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE app. A, at 824 (8th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as HUEBNER];
MEHR, supra note 39, at 212.
44. See text accompanying note 49 infra.
45. An examination of the interest option reveals a close resemblance to the life-estateplus-remainder situation which the statute specifically includes as a possible generationskipping trust equivalent. See I.R.C. §2611(d)(1). This is especially true if the interest and
limited withdrawals are to be paid to one beneficiary while the remaining principal is to be
paid to a second one. Given this analogy, it is probable that these arrangements will be dealt
with as generation-skipping trust equivalents whenever there are two or more levels of
younger generation beneficiaries involved. See text accompanying notes 50-53 infra.
46. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
47. The time certain option is also known as a term certain. A common variation similar
to the time certain option is the annuity certain option. See generally RIEGEL, supra note 39,
at 183. See text accompanying note 55 infra.
48. See text accompanying note 57 infra.
49. When all proceeds are distributed at once, there would be no monies left in the
possession of the company and hence no possibility of periodic or delayed payments. Since
there are no delayed payments to younger generation beneficiaries, there can be no generationskipping trust equivalent based upon this method of payment alone. See text accompanying
notes 11-14 supra.
50. MEHR, supra note 39, at 214. Current policies guarantee only 2 to 2 1/2% interest but
are actually paying 3 to 3 1/2%. For an example of policy paying excess interest over the
guarantee, see In re Harper's Estate, 124 Mont. 52, 218 P.2d 927 (1950).
51. McGILL, supra note 39, at 118. The ability to withdraw principal provides flexibility
for the beneficiary.
52. The primary beneficiary is the person named by the insured to first take the proceeds
upon the insured's death. The insured "may name several successive beneficiaries in the
order in which they are to take priority should the primary beneficiary not survive the insured or not live to collect the full amount of the proceeds guaranteed under a settlement
option. These successive beneficiaries are known as 'contingent' or 'secondary', 'tertiary', etc."
MEHR, supra note 39, at 184. See also MEYER, supra note 40, at 384.
53. The optional arrangement may be prearranged by either the insured, the primary or
the secondary beneficiary. There is a growing trend in companies toward letting secondary
beneficiaries select their own settlement option instead of taking a lump sum distribution.
Those selections are not granted until the secondary beneficiary is due to start receiving
proceeds. McGILL, supra note 39, at 137.
54. The amount of the payments depend upon the beneficiary's life expectancy, interest
rates used by the company and the amount of principal to be paid out. This option may provide differing income for different time periods, such as greater payments until eligibility for
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The time certain option provides that proceeds are paid in installments for
the life of the primary beneficiary. If the primary beneficiary dies before the
end of the time period designated in the option, the payments will be continued
to a secondary beneficiary or to the primary beneficiary's estate until the end of
the period.55 The time certain periods offered usually range from five to twenty
years.568
Under the joint and survivor options, proceeds are paid in installments
until the death of the last surviving beneficiary. Payments may be level
5
throughout or may be reduced upon the death of the first beneficiary to die. 7
It appears that a generation-skipping trust equivalent could never exist in
the case of lump sum or straight life income settlements since these never involve delayed payments to more than one beneficiary. However, it is possible
to imagine situations in which the interest option, the time certain option and
the joint and survivor options could create generation-skipping trust equivalents since each of these options involve the possibility of payments over a
period of time to two or more individuals who could be in different generations
each younger than that of the grantor. For example, if the insured chooses the
interest option under which interest or interest plus limited withdrawal rights
is to be paid to the primary beneficiary and the first contingent beneficiary with
distribution of remaining principal to the third beneficiary, the arrangement
would be a generation-skipping trust equivalent if the beneficiaries are assigned to two different generation levels that are both younger than that of the
insured.5 8 Another arrangement59 under interest options that would probably
social security benefits with decreased benefits thereafter. This option is often found in combination with the annuity certain option. See generally MEHR, supra note 39, at 217; MEYER,
supra note 40; RIEGEL, supra note 39, at 184.
55. HUEBNER, supra note 43, at 227. For an example of a policy paying the remaining
proceeds to the primary beneficiary's estate when payments were under a fixed time period,
see In re Walker's Estate Tax, 79 N.Y.S.2d 377 (Sur. Ct. 1948).
56. This option may also direct payment of the remaining principal at the death of the
first beneficiary in a lump sum. A similar option is the refund annuity under which payments
continue to the second beneficiary until the original proceeds are exhausted. This option may
also be designed for payments to end after a time certain. See RiEGFL, supra note 39, at 184.
57. This option may be combined with a time certain period or a refund feature. Such a
combination would create the possibility of a third beneficiary in addition to the two primary
beneficiaries. See generally RIEGEL, supra note 39, at 185.
58. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra. An example of a generation-skipping trust
equivalent would be an option to pay interest to the insured's wife and son with principal
going to the grandchildren. Such an arrangement involves interests and powers in two or
more younger generation beneficiaries assigned to more than one generation lower than that
of the insured. Therefore, it seems certain that a trust equivalent would be deemed to exist
under that arrangement.
59. For an example of a case where an insured selected an interest option that might be
classified as a generation-skipping trust equivalent today, see In re Loewenstein's Estate, 37
Cal. 2d 843, 236 P.2d 566 (1951). In that case the insured contracted with the insurance company to hold the proceeds of the policy upon his death, with interest payable to his niece and
her husband. At the death of the niece, interest payments were to continue to her son and at
his death the proceeds would be paid to his surviving spouse or children or, if none, to a
charitable organization. The court held that since the niece had the power to withdraw
principal in whole or in part, the entire amount of proceeds were includable in her gross
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create a trust equivalent would be the payment of interest with or without a
power to withdraw principal to two younger generation beneficiaries at the
same time with the remaining principal at their deaths to be distributed to a
third younger generation beneficiary who is assigned to a generation younger
0
than the interest recipients (i.e. from sons to grandchildren).6
The second standard option that could create a generation-skipping arrangement is the time-certain option. 61 If the proceeds are to be paid to a
beneficiary assigned to a generation younger than the insured and he dies before the end of the time certain period, the payments must continue to a
second beneficiary or to the first beneficiary's estate. If the second beneficiary is
assigned to an even younger generation than the first beneficiary, then a
62
generation-skipping trust equivalent has been created.
The joint and survivor annuity63 also runs the risk of classification as a trust
equivalent. For example, if the insured left a joint and survivor annuity to his
son and grandson, this would certainly be a generation-skipping arrangement
because the son and grandson would be younger generation beneficiaries in two
different generations both younger than that of the insured. Since this option is
often combined with the time certain option, the possibility of a third beneficiary being involved only increases the possibility that it may be classified as
a trust equivalent. It may be that this is the option that will most frequently
be deemed a trust equivalent since it always involves at least two beneficiaries.
In view of the likelihood that three of the various settlement options might
easily be classified as trust equivalents,64 it seems certain that both insurance
companies and beneficiaries must soon deal with the complicated provisions of
this new law. Of course, policies created after effective date are covered by the
new law. It may be, however, that policies created before the effective date may
also be affected. The applicability of the tax to that latter category is examined
next.

estate. This arrangement would very likely be classified as a generation-skipping trust equivalent under the statute today.
60. Indeed, it is an accepted practice in insurance policies to name a class as beneficiary
under the policy. MCGILL, supra note 39, at 18-19. Problems can arise in designating classes as
beneficiaries. The insurance company may have difficulty determining the members of the class
and locating those persons. For those reasons, class designations are usually not accepted by
insurance companies if the relationship to the insured is too remote. Id. at 19.
For a discussion of the possible effects of separate share rules on class beneficiaries, see text

accompanying notes 97-106 infra.
See text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
62. For an example of an arrangement that would probably be classified a trust equivalent under the time certain option see Estate of Minotto v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.M. (CCH)
1117,752 (1950). In Minotto, a father/insured chose a settlement option paying the proceeds to
his daughter in thirty equal installments. If she died before receiving all thirty installments,
the payments were to continue to her two children until exhausted. The daughter died after
seven payments. The court held the remaining twenty-three payments were not part of the
61.

daughter's gross estate.
63. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
64. See text accompanying notes 58-63 supra.
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POLICIES IN FORCE BEFoRE APRIL 30, 1976
Since the Chapter 13 tax applies only to generation-skipping trusts created
5
after April 30, 1976, or to corpus added to those trusts after that date,6 it
would seem that those policies in force before that date would not be affected
by the new tax. However, this is not necessarily true. First, even if the settlement options had been irrevocably selected by the insured before the effective
date, there remains the possibility that the corpus8 7 of the trust equivalent may
be considered to have been increased by premium payments after the effective
date. If so, transfers made out of the additions to corpus may be subject to the
tax.
The argument in favor of such a view is that a discontinuance of premium
payments would cause the policy to lapse, thereby destroying the trust equivalent. Therefore, the continuing premium payments must be considered to
increase the fund in some manner. The difficulty is how to quantify the increase. One method would be to compute the ratio of post-effective date
premiums paid to total premiums paid with the resulting ratio being the percentage of the fund that is due to increases to corpus after the effective date.
This would require insurance companies to separately account for pre- and
post-effective date premium payments of all pre-effective date policies. Another
method would be to compare the cash surrender value at death of the insured
with the cash surrender value on April 30, 1976. Any difference would be the
increase to corpus added after the effective date of the tax. 8
In support of the view that post-effective date premiums do not go to increase corpus is the fact that the amount of proceeds of the policy has not
changed between the Chapter 13 effective date and the insured's date of death.
If the insured had died May 1, 1976, the beneficiary would have received exactly the same amount as he would receive if death occurred ten years later.
Thus, it can be argued that no additions to the actual trust corpus have been
made and the policy should not be subject to the tax.
Pre-effective date insurance policies that are likely to be subject to the tax
are those policies in which the settlement option has been selected, but the
selection is revocable.69 If the insured dies before January 1, 1982, without having revoked his election and without having increased the amount of the
generation-skipping transfer,70 the arrangement will escape tax.71 Again the
65. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
66. Discussion of settlement options after this point will presume the option is one that
may become a generation-skipping trust equivalent.
67. Although there is technically no corpus as such in an insurance policy, one must presume that the policy proceeds will be used to fill this role in the generation-skipping trust
equivalent calculations of taxable distributions and taxable terminations.
68. Another proposal would be to compare the value of the death proceeds with the cash
surrender value on the effective date. This proposal does not seem logical, however, since the
comparison would be like comparing apples with oranges.
69. This situation would fall clearly within §2006(c)(2)(B) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
dealing with revocable trusts. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
70. For a discussion of what constitutes a generation-skipping transfer see text accompanying notes 15-24 supra.

71. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
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question arises as to whether the payment of premiums after the effective date
has increased the amount of the generation-skipping transfer. 2 If the insured
changes his election or if he survives until January 1, 1982, and is not under a
mental disability7 3 the policy proceeds will create a generation-skipping trust
equivalent.74
Any option selection by the insured after the effective date that creates a
generation-skipping ararngement with respect to pre-effective date policies
should certainly subject those policies to the tax since the actual generationskipping arrangement has been created after the effective date. Those policies
should be treated no differently than policies that are written after April 30,
1976.
Once it is determined that a policy is subject to the tax, there are likely to
be problems interpreting the new law in its application to the policy. Each of
these problems will have to be resolved before an orderly method for taxing
life insurance trust equivalents can be established.
PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION

Identifying the Grantor
One problem that will require resolution is the determination of the
identity of the grantor of the trust. In the statute itself the term "grantor" is
not defined. The committee reports refer to the grantor as the person who contributes or adds property to the trust.7 5 In an insurance context, three choices
are available: the owner of the policy,7 6 the insured, or the beneficiary.

In cases where the non-beneficiary owner or insured has designated the
option to be followed and has named the various beneficiaries or classes of
beneficiaries, it seems appropriate that he will be the grantor of the trust. In
such a situation, the owner or insured has contributed the property by funding
the policy and has designated the insurance proceeds to be used in the specified
option. It could be said that he is the creator of the trust. His role in the
generation-skipping trust would seem to fit comfortably within the coverage of
the grantor concept.
If no settlement option has been selected before death, 77 the proceeds will
72. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
73. If the insured was mentally incompetent on April 30, 1976, and could, therefore, not
change his revocable election, ithe trust equivalent would not be subject to the generationskipping tax until two years after he regains mental competency or January 1, 1982, whichever is later. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, tit. xx, §2006(c)(2), 90 Stat. 1520.
74. Id. §2006(c)(2)(B).
75. H.R. REP., supra note 3,at 48. See note 14 supra.
76. The owner of the policy may be a different person than either the insured or the
beneficiary. He is usually the person who initially contracted for the insurance. The owner of
the policy usually pays the premiums, has rights to the cash surrender value and has power to
designate beneficiaries. In most cases ownership is in either the insured or beneficiary. See
generally D. MCGILL, LIFE INSUPANCE 592 (rev. ed. 1967).
77. This is probably the more usual case since few insured wish to create inflexibility for
the beneficiary. However, if substantial wealth is involved as would usually be the case in
policies designated as trust equivalents, insureds may be more willing to delineate the exact
manner of distribution of policy proceeds. See generally HUERNER, supra note 43, at 233-236.
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be paid out in a lump sum. 78 Rather than taking all the proceeds at once, the
beneficiary is usually given the opportunity to choose any of the options available under the policy.79 In that situation it is possible that either the insured/
owner or the beneficiary may be deemed to be the grantor. An argument can
be made that since the insured created the fund by purchasing the insurance
and keeping it in force, he should be the grantor. If that view were followed,
it would take only a primary beneficiary in a generation younger than the insured and one other younger generation beneficiary assigned to a generation
younger than the primary beneficiary to have a generation-skipping trust
equivalent.8 0 However, if the primary beneficiary has the power to take distribution in a lump sum but elects an option instead, perhaps the beneficiary
should be considered the grantor.8 ' It may be contended that in reality the
beneficiary is the person creating the trust by contributing the proceeds that
were to be paid to him in a lump sum. Several analogous situations may be
used to support the contention that the primary beneficiary is the grantor. In
the estate tax area, Congress has determined that property subject to a general
83
power of appointment8 2 by a decedent will be included in his gross estate.
The reasoning behind this policy is the realization that holding a general
power of appointment is tantamount to outright ownership of property.8 4 Since
in the insurance area under discussion the beneficiary can either take the
proceeds himself or leave them to be distributed according to his option designation, he also can be deemed to have outright ownership of the property.85
78.
79.

Id. at 226.
Id. at 226-227.

80. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
81. If the beneficiary is deemed to be the grantor, the possibility of creating a generationskipping trust equivalent will be greatly diminished. For a generation-skipping trust to be
created, when the beneficiary is deemed to be the grantor, there will have to be at least two
beneficiaries named in his chosen settlement option that are in different generation levels,
both younger than the grantor/beneficiary. While this might occur if the proceeds are large
enough to give the beneficiary considerable bargaining power, it will not be the usual case
since companies are more restrictive as to the flexibility and duration of options chosen by
beneficiaries. See HUEBNER, supra note 43, at 227. See note 39 supra.
82. I.R.C. §2041.
83. The generation-skipping tax statute specifically exempts from tax transfers that have
been subjected to estate or gift taxes. Id. §2613(a)(4)(B) & §2613(b)(5)(B).
84. See Stephens & Calfee, supra note 2, at 449; R. STEPHENS, G. MAXFIELD & S. Lso,
FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION 4-202 (3d ed. 1974 & Supp. 1977). But see note 94 infra.
85. Under I.R.C. §2039(a) a decedent's gross estate includes "the value of an annuity or
other payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent under any
form of contract or agreement entered into after March 3, 1931 ... if, under such contract or
agreement, an annuity or other payment was payable to the decedent, or the decedent
possessed the right to receive such annuity or payment, either alone or in conjunction with
another for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for
any period which does not in fact end before his death." The amounts are includable to the
extent that the decedent contributed to the purchase price of the annuity. Although there
are no cases applying this section to elections of options by beneficiaries, it is conceivable
that the requisite ownership of proceeds could be found such that the beneficiary would be
deemed to have purchased the settlement annuity with policy proceeds. Under such an interpretation the payments remaining at the beneficiary's death would be included in his gross
estate under §2039(b).
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Thus, it is really the beneficiary who is contributing the property to the trust
and designating the manner of its disposition.86
A second analogy that can be drawn to insurance contracts under which the
beneficiary controls settlement options is in the area of insurance trusts. On
some occasions a beneficiary may have manifested his intention to hold funds
in trust for a second beneficiary when it was his belief that that was the desire
of the insured. When courts have found that the insured did not create the
trust, some courts have gone further to find that the beneficiary, by his manifestation and acts, has created a trust even though the insured did not do so.8 7
Those courts have further held that it is the beneficiary who is the settlor of
the trust.8 8 In the instant situation the beneficiary may have manifested the
requisite intention through choosing the option and designating beneficiaries.
Perhaps the courts will agree that in this case he is the grantor. However, the
case for the beneficiary as grantor may not in fact prevail. In a recent decision
the Tax Court took a position that seemingly contradicts the argument that
the beneficiary has ownership through his power to control the proceeds. Estate
of Haggett v. Commissioner-9 dealt with a refund annuity9° purchased with
funds from the estate of decedent's husband. Under the annuity the beneficiary
had the right to surrender the contract for its cash value 9' and to designate the
beneficiaries of the remainder interest.92 The court held that no part of the
value of the annuity was includable in the beneficiary's gross estate. 93 It seems
reasonable that if the court had agreed that the above powers gave the beneficiary ownership of the entire annuity value, it would have included that value
86. In Equitable Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Commissioner, 31 BTA 329 (1934), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom, Commissioner v. Chase Nat'l Bank of N.Y., 82 F.2d 157, 36-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9154 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 552 (1936) the court held that when a decedent
had the right to direct what should be done with certain annuity-like payments payable to
her estate after her death, the commuted value of the payments would be includable in her
estate. (The commuted value is the lump sum amount that represents the present value of
remaining installment payments. See D. McGILL, LIFE INSURANCE, supra note 76, at 646.) The
court apparently belived the decedent had a sufficient inter vivos interest in the post-death
payments to warrant inclusion in her estate. Applying this reasoning to the beneficiary/
grantor question, a similar interest appears. This case supports the idea of the trust equivalent property being contributed by the beneficiary rather than the insured. But see Estate of
Haggett v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 325 (1950); Estate of Wittmann v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M.

(CCH) f119,054 (1952).
87. "If . . . after the death of the insured, the beneficiary manifests his intent to hold
the funds in trust for a proper purpose, the trust will be created, but it is the beneficiary who
is the settlor of the trust." A. SMITH, PERSONAL LIFE INSURANCE TRusTs 29 (1950). SMITH cites
the following cases as authority: Devries' Estate v. Hawkins, 70 Neb. 656, 97 N.W. 792 (1903);
Gribbel v. Gribbel, 341 Pa. 11, 17 A.2d 892 (1941); In re Free's Estate, 327 Pa. 362, 194 A. 492
(1937); Pugh v. Gaines, 156 Pa. Super. Ct. 613, 41 A.2d 287 (1944).
88. Id.
89. 14 T.C. 325 (1950).
90. For a description of the refund annuity see note 56 supra.
91. The cash value would be the commuted value of remaining payments due at any
particular time. For a definition of commuted value see note 86 supra.
92. The remainder interest is the right to whatever payments have not yet been paid at
the primary beneficiary's death. If the policy had previously been surrendered for its cash
value, there would be no remainder interest.
93. Accord, Estate of Wittmann v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) ff19,054 (1952).
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in her estate. Apparently, the court felt that less than full ownership was
present. Because the powers of the beneficiary in Haggett are very similar to
the powers of a beneficiary in the situation here, it is possible that the beneficiary would not be deemed the grantor. 4
Payments to an Estate
A second problem in interpreting the law concerns the effect of payments
made to a beneficiary's estate. Since the statute specifically exempts from the
tax any transfer that has been subject to estate or gift taxes,95 any payments to
an estate that are deemed part of the estate for tax purposes will fall out of the
generation-skipping problem. 98
Separate Shares
Whenever a policy is designed to make simultaneous payments to two or
more younger generation beneficiaries, the arrangement should be examined
closely for potential applicability of the separate share rules7 before any taxable termination or taxable distributions are declared or postponed. Depending
on regulations yet to be proposed, 98 a finding of separate shares in a trust
94. Consider also the fact that the statute defines a beneficiary as someone with an interest or power in the trust. I.R.C. §2613(c)(3). A power is defined as "any power to establish or
alter beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or income of the trust." Id. §2613(d)(2). This definition covers both special and general powers of appointment. See, e.g., Stephens & Calfee, supra
note 2, at 566. Although the transfer from a beneficiary with a general power of appointment would be excluded from tax, since it is subject to estate or gift tax, (see note 83 supra)
he is still recognized by the statute as a beneficiary. The statute does not name him a grantor
because of his ownership through the general power of appointment. If the statute did not
intend for a person with a general power of appointment to be the grantor, then it is possible the beneficiary who selects a settlement option may also escape that designation.
95. See note 83 supra.
96. In the unlikely event that some payments were deemed to be not within the beneficiary's estate in this situation, it will become necessary to determine the generation level of
the estate as compared with the grantor. The statute specifically provides for veil piercing
whenever a beneficiary in a generation-skipping trust is an estate. I.R.C. §2611(c)(7). In such
circumstances anyone "having an indirect interest or power in the trust through [the estate]
shall be treated as a beneficiary of the trust and shall be assigned to a generation ..
" Id.
It seems unlikely that the decedent beneficiary would designate a person in his will to take
the remainder of his insurance proceeds. If he was so inclined, he probably would have done
so directly with the insurance company. Assuming he has not, the question becomes whether
all beneficiaries to the estate will be deemed to have an indirect interest, and thus be assigned generations, or whether the residuary legatee would be the only person so deemed.
The answer to this question may be affected by the size of the estate and the amount that
the residuary legatee will ultimately receive. Assuming that the commuted value under the
policy is less than the total residuary fund to be taken by the residuary beneficiary, the better
rule would make him the sole beneficiary with an indirect interest in the policy proceeds since
all of the proceeds are for his benefit. Thus, the residuary legatee would be the only person
assigned to a generation for trust equivalent purposes and the total number of beneficiaries
involved will be kept to a minimum. Either way, though, the risk is present that a generationskipping trust equivalent will be found since it is possible that both the residuary legatee and
other beneficiaries of the estate are assigned to generations younger than the deceased payee.
97. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
98. Under the statute, the Secretary is directed to prescribe regulations dealing with the
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equivalent may do one of two things. First, in taxable terminations when the
taxable event would normally be postponed, a trust with separate shares would
eliminate the postponement thereby invoking an unexpected taxable event. On
the other hand, in a taxable distribution, taxable events may be eliminated
altogether by a finding of separate shares.
Looking first at taxable terminations, the statute provides that whenever
there are two or more younger generation beneficiaries on the same generation
level taking benefits at the same time, taxable terminations will be postponed
99
until the termination of the last such beneficiary's interest. However, if those
same beneficiaries are found to have separate shares, that is that they "are
nominally beneficiaries under the same trust, [but] actually have interests
100
then
which are identifiable and separate from those of other beneficiaries"
1° 1
of
a
finding
upon
Thus,
the taxable event will no longer be postponed.
accompanying
with
be
triggered
separate shares the taxable termination will
filing and tax requirements.
In the taxable distribution situation a finding of separate shares may have
the opposite effect, possibly eliminating taxable events altogether. Although
the commentators 0 2 and committee reports do not refer to separate share
treatment in taxable distributions, application of the principle to distributions
is nowhere precluded. The result of application would be the elimination of
taxable distributions when simultaneous beneficiaries on two or more genera103
Considering the great intion levels were found to possess separate shares.
1 04
in annuity situations, the application of
justice created by the source rule
separate share rules to sever these distributions would be particularly appropritreatment of separate shares. I.R.C. §2622. It may be presumed these regulations will bear
some resemblance to the separate shares guidelines in Section 663(c) which concentrate on
"whether distributions of the trust are to be made in substantially the same manner as if
separate trust had been created." Treas. Reg. §1.663(c)-3(a) (1956). See, e.g., S. CONF. REP. No.
94-1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess 618, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 807 [hereinafter cited as CONF.
REP.]; Stephens & Calfee, supra note 2, at 456-57.

99. I.R.C. §2613(b)(2)(A). See also §2613(b)(2)(D).
100. The committee reports state that "there are certain instances where several individuals, who are nominally beneficiaries under the same trust, actually have interests that are
identifiable and separate from those of other beneficiaries. Under the committee bill, these
interests are to be treated as interests in separate trusts, in accordance with 'separate share'
rules to be prescribed in regulations."
"For example, assume that the grantor establishes a trust for the benefit of his two
children, A and B. Under the terms of the trust, 50 percent of the income must be allocated
to each of the two children and, upon the death of either child, 50 percent of the corpus of
the trust is to be distributed to that child's grandchildren. Under these circumstances, the
separate shares rules would apply, and there would be a taxable termination upon the death
of either A or B with respect to (hat child's share of the trust." H.R. Rep., supra note 3, at
51.
101.

See generally Stephens & Calfee, supra note 2, at 456-57, 528; R.

SKIPPING TRANSFERS

IN TRUST 44-45 (1976) [hereinafter cited

COVEY,

GENERATION-

COVEY].

102. Id.
103. Essentially separate trusts would be found to exist, therefore, there would be no
older generation younger generation beneficiary in the same trust so by definition there could
be no taxable distribution. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
104. The source rule requires that all corpus be allocated first to the younger generation
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ate. An alternative result of application of separate share rules to annuity trust
equivalent distributions would be to tax each younger generation beneficiary
on the portion of corpus received in each annuity payment regardless of generation level. This would not eliminate the taxable distribution but would
spread the tax liability more evenly over those who in reality benefit from the
annuity.
In the insurance context, separate shares would probably be created in
many cases. Simultaneous payments are usually entirely independent of each
other and are predetermined as to both size and duration of payments. 0 5 They
should, therefore, qualify as separate shares since they are being made essentially as if they were in separate trusts. The only time when one share would
be affected by another in most cases is when a member of a class dies and his
portion is used to increase payments to the surviving class members. At least
one commentator believes that even this situation would qualify for separate
share treatment. 0 6 Until regulations are promulgated, many questions will remain in this area.
Valuing the Generation-SkippingTransfer in a Taxable Termination
Whenever a taxable termination occurs, a tax will have to be paid on the
amount of the corpus transferred to the succeeding generation. To do this, it is
essential to know the amount of corpus being held by the insurance company.
Since insurers do not maintain a traditional trust corpus, 07 some method must
be used to obtain a value for the proceeds to be paid out to future beneficiaries.
If a lump sum payment is made, there will be no problem since the amount
of the lump sum will be the value of the generation-skipping transfer. On the
other hand, if periodic payments are to continue to future beneficiaries, some
other method will have to be used.
One approach to value the amount of the transfer would be to use the
present value of the remaining payouts. This figure could be calculated by use
of individual company actuarial assumptions, 08 or by standardized assumptions
published in regulations109
of simultaneous benefit recipients when two or more levels of younger generation beneficiaries

receive benefits in the same year. See note 21 supra. See also Stephens & Calfee, supra note 2,
at 528. This rule seems to create a particularly unjust situation in annuities in which benefits to each beneficiary are normally independent of each other and not the result of trustee
discretion or trust earnings. The result created is that younger beneficiaries bear the entire
burden of taxable distributions when their benefits are not related to benefits of older beneficiaries as they are in a traditional trust.
105. See, McGim, LiFE INSURANCE, supra note 80, at 579-80.
106. "[S]eparate share treatment may exist even though upon the death of a beneficiary
his share will be added to shares of other beneficiaries." CovEY, supra note 101, at 44.
107. There is no segregated fund supporting each policy and payments are not dependent
on individual corpus earnings. See text accompanyin gnotes 146-148 infra.
108. Each company, in setting up the settlement option rates for each policy, used certain
actuarial assumptions, (i.e., interest, mortality, etc.) to determine the amount of periodic payment it would offer per dollar of policy proceeds under each selection. HUEBNER, supra note
43, at 330-45; MEr, supra note 39, at 502-30. These same assumptions could be used to figure
the present value of the remaining payments.
109. Standardized assumptions published in regulations would have the advantage of
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Another approach would be to use the cost of purchasing annuities of like
amount for the younger generation beneficiaries at the time of the taxable
termination. This is the approach used in estate tax contexts for valuing annuity contracts." 0 It would have the advantage of simplicity and familiarity
since it is already in use."'
Valuing the Generation-SkippingTransfer in a Taxable Distribution
A more difficult calculation will be involved when taxable distributions
occur. Except in the case of a pure interest option," 2 all payments to insurance
3
beneficiaries will involve at least a partial taxable distribution of corpus1
since payments consist of part proceeds and part interest."1 The problem is
how to segregate corpus from income in the insurance payouts, since only the
portion of distributions that represents corpus is taxed under the generationskipping statute. The valuation alternatives are more numerous here than in
the taxable termination situation.
Looking first to the statute for guidance, one finds a definition of trust income in Section 643(b) of the Code. 1 5 In that section, trust income is defined
as "the amount of income of the estate or trust for the taxable year" 6 determined under the terms of the governing instrument and applicable local
law." 1"' This definition, when applied to insurance policies, is of little help." 8
Governing instruments of policies rarely, if ever, set forth any means of
determining income in periodic payout situations. Local laws do not deal with
uniformity when compared with the wide variation in assumptions used by companies. One
short term drawback, however, would be the delay created while waiting for official tables to
be published by the Treasury.
110. "The value of a contract for the payment of an annuity or an insurance policy on
the life of a person other than the decedent, issued by a company regularly engaged in the
selling of contracts of that character is established through the sale by that company of comparable contracts." TREAs. REG. §20.2031-8(a)(1) (1958). See, e.g., Mearkle's Estate v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 386, 1942-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 10,193 (3d Cir. 1942); United States Trust Co. v.
Higgins, 56 F. Supp. 997, 1942-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 110,199 (D.C.N.Y. 1942); Estate of Pruyn v.
Commissioner, 12 T.C. 754 (1949). Each of the above cases held that the value to be included
in the primary annuitant's gross estate was the cost of purchasing replacement annunities of
like amount for the remaining beneficiary at the date of decedent's death.
111. Each of the suggested methods would reach a different result. It is doubtful that
any regularity can be achieved until regulations are published.
112. A pure interest option would distribute only interest on the proceeds held by the
insurance company. See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
113. This assumes that the original proceeds of the policy are considered the corpus.
114. The principle of periodic payments to a beneficiary assumes the gradual liquidation
of the proceeds over time coupled with interest on whatever amounts are still in the possession of the insurance company. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra for a discussion of
the types of periodic payments to which this principle applies. See MEHR, supra note 39, at
214-18.
115. This is the definition specifically referred to in Chapter 13 when trust income is
discussed. See I.R.C. §2613(a)(1).
116. See text accompanying notes 132-138 infra for a discussion of the problems in determining the taxable year of an insurance trust equivalent.
117. I.R.C. §643(b).
118. See Stephens & Calfee, supra note 2, at 525-26.
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the subject at all. Thirty-six states 119 have adopted, with minor modification,
either the 1962 or 1931 version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act.
However, nowhere in the Act is the subject of insurance proceeds directly
addressed and there appears little hope of indirectly applying its terms to insurance. As might be expected, the Uniform Principal and Income Act is ad20
dressed to the traditional trust situation in which principal has been set aside
and income is derived from its use and paid to beneficiaries. Allocation of expenses and revenues between principal and income is the major purpose of the
Act. 1 21 This allocation has no practical relevance in the insurance agreement
context since the entire relationship is controlled by contract and no segregation of funds exists. Indeed, in the Uniform Principal and Income Act the only
mention of annuities is to classify them entirely as allocated to the income of
the trust. 122 It is doubtful that the Internal Revenue Service will accept the
argument that local law makes all annuity payments income. If this were the
case, all taxable distributions from insurance proceeds and annuities would be
eliminated.
Assuming that taxable distributions do exist in an annuity situation, an
approach for their valuation must be found. One method would be to rely
entirely on insurance company actuaries to supply figures derived from their
own actuarial assumptions used in setting up the particular payment schedules.
They might consider all assumptions originally used2s when they first determined the payments to be made or they might limit their calculations to the
interest rate assumed in the payment determinations224 The result of using individual company assumptions would be considerable variation in the taxable
amounts from company to company for identical distributions. However, this
may not be considered a disadvantage by Service officials, since the current approach used in valuing annuities for estate tax purposes involves an equal
1 25
amount of variation.
A second valuation possibility is to adopt the method used to calculate the

portion of annuities includable in gross income. 26 Section 72 of the Code provides an exclusion from gross income for the portion of annuity payments that
represent return of the cost of the annuity. Each year, the amount received as
an annuity is multiplied by the ratio of the annuity's cost to expected return to
determine the excluded amount. The expected return is determined by the
119. Preface to UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Aar at 633, 657 (1970 & Supp. 1977).
120. Section 3 of the 1962 Revised Act reads: "(a) Income is the return in money or property derived from the use of principal ... (b) Principal is the property which has been set
aside by the owner or the person legally empowered so that it is held in trust eventually to be
delivered to a remainderman while the return or use of the principal is in the meantime
taken or received by or held for accumulation for an income beneficiary."
121. See Preface to UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACr (1970 &Supp. 1977).

122. Id. §4.
123. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
124. Id.
125. See note 110 supra.
126. I.R.C. §72. The same basic approach is also used by §101(d) in determining the
amount included in gross income from life insurance proceeds paid out through settlement
options other than interest options.
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expected duration of payments. If the duration of payments is contingent on
the life of the beneficiary,t27 an average life expectancy is obtained from
standard mortality tables published in regulations.128 This same method could
be used to determine the portion of each taxable distribution that is return of
proceeds for purchase cost since in settlement options it is the proceeds that in
effect purchase the settlement annuity. Since this method is currently in use in
the annuity area its application would be readily understood by practitioners.
In addition, with tables already published for use, it would be easy to imple129
ment in the generation-skipping context.
Under either of the proposed methods, the total amount of corpus distributed, once determined, will be reassigned to the younger generation of the
recipient beneficiaries, through application of the statutory presumption.130
The result will be large distributions each year to younger beneficiaries while
older beneficiaries have either pure income or greatly reduced distributions.
This result seems harsh and will hopefully be eliminated by separate share
rules.' 3'
Taxable Year of the Trust
Whenever a taxable generation-skipping transfer occurs, the distributee or
trustee must file a return and pay the tax. 32 The time for filing the return in
the case of a live deemed transferor 1 3 is ". . . on or before the 90th day after
the close of the taxable year of the trust ... ,,1.4Thus,it becomes necessary to
identify the taxable year of trust in order to enable the distributee or trustee to
file a return within the required time. s"5 Several alternatives suggest themselves
in the insurance context. Among the alternatives are the taxable year of the
127. See TREAS. REC. §§1.72-1 to -19 (1956). These regulations also contain standard
actuarial tables for calculating the expected return when other contingencies are involved.
128. Id. §1.72-9, Table 1.
129. A third approach would be to treat payments whose duration depend on one or more
lifetimes as open ended transactions. Under this approach an analogy could be drawn to the
Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (19:31), open transaction in the capital gains area in which the
amount realized is not calculable. In Burnet it was determined that period payments would
first go to reduce basis until all basis was recovered and amounts received thereafter would
be capital gain. This approach seems inequitable since early beneficiaries will bear the entire
burden of the tax while later beneficiaries will receive nontaxable income.
130. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
131. See text accompanying notes 97-106 supra.
132. I.R.C. §2621(c)(I)(B).
133. When the deemed transferor is dead at the time of a generation-skipping transfer,
the return must be filed on or before the 90th day after the last day for filing the estate tax
return of the deemed transferor. If that date has passed, the return is due nine months after
the transfer. I.R.C. §2621(c)(1)(B)(ii).
134. I.R.C. §2621(c)(1)(B)(i).
135. A second situation in which knowledge of the trust's taxable year is needed is in
determining income for the trust under the statutory definition of income used to determine
amounts not out of income which will be taxable distributions if distributed. See text accompanying notes 112-129 supra. Since this definition of income does not seem easily applicable to the insurance arrangement, it might be wise to dispense with it in income calcaulations,
thus eliminating in that context the need for a taxable year date.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1978

21

Florida Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1978], Art. 4
GENERATION-SKIPPING TAX

insurance company itself,1 36 the policy year of the original policy of insureither the death of the insured or
ance,137 and the yearly period beginning with
38
the commencement of settlement payments.
PAYMENT OF Tm TAX
9
When a taxable distribution occurs, the distributee is liable for the tax.'Imposition of this liability on the distributee makes practical sense because he
holds the distributed property and thus has a ready fund out of which the tax
can be satisfied. 40 When a taxable termination occurs, the trustee pays the
tax.'4 ' In the traditional trust situation in which the trustee continues to hold
the principal, this arrangement also makes sense since ultimately, the tax is
paid out of principal. 42 In the insurance context, however, the fairness and
practicality of placing the tax burden on the trustee in the taxable termination
situation disappears. Insurance companies may face problems recovering the
tax from insurance proceeds 43 and may face unrecoverable liability when
44
deemed transferors die within three years of the transfer.1 In addition, the
government may face obstacles in trying to collect the tax from the insurance
45
company.

Rezmbursement for the Tax
Unlike the traditional trust setting, an insurance company does not hold a
segregated fund for each policy upon which income is earned. 46 Expenses are
not charged to the funds of a policy and payments do not generally vary with
the investment experience or expense history of the insurance company. 47 In136. As taxable entities, each insurance company will have its own taxable year.
137. Each policy has a policy year for purposes of premium payments. The beginning
and ending dates are determined by the yearly periods commencing with the original effec-

tive date of the policy.
138. See generally Stephens & Calfee, supra note 2, at 527. There are probably other

suggestions that are equally viable. Regulations will hopefully deal with this problem.
139. I.R.C. §2603(a)(1)(B).
140. Id. The distributee's liability is limited to thc fair market value of the distribution
as of the date of transfer.
141. I.R.C. §2603(a)(1)(A).
142. The tax attributable to a taxable termination would be paid out of the principal in
the traditional trust, thereby decreasing the principal. The decrease in principal will also decrease the income earnings on the trust in most cases.
143. See text accompanying notes 146-159 infra.
144. See text accompanying notes 169 & 170 infra.
145. See text accompanying notes 160-164 infra.
146. See 2 INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §882 (J. Appleman ed. 1941 & Supp. 1977);
HUEBNER, supra note 43, at 242; SMITH, supra note 87, at 13.
147. The exception to this statement arises with the interest option and with variable
annuities. In the interest option, the company often pays interest in excess of the rate
guaranteed in the policy. This additional interest is dependent on company earnings experience. See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra. In variable annuities, investment risk is assumed by the annuitant instead of the company. The investment dollars are used to purchase annuity units that vary in price with the investment experience of all units. As payments are due from the annuity, the units are liquidated and the current value of the fixed
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stead, the entire relationship between beneficiary and insurance company is
controlled by the policy contract. 14 The company has agreed to make certain
payments for a specified time period and the beneficiary or insured has agreed
to pay the contract price by way of premium payments or proceeds retention by
the company. Under the terms of the contract, any variation from the agreement would be a breach. 149 Only those policies that provide for recovery of
extraordinary expenses or taxes that might occur in the future would be able
to recover generation-skipping taxes under the express policy provisions.
Whether such provisions are common in existing policies is unknown. In those
policies without such provisions the insurance company is to pay the taxes in
generation-skipping transfers, but has no express provision under which to be
reimbursed from the trust equivalent property. Surely, Congress did not intend
these taxes to be paid out of company profits, 150 but the law provides no means
of reimbursement. The only portion of the statute that lends possible support
to an argument for reimbursement is the fact that in a taxable termination a
lien is placed upon property transferred until the tax is paid. 151 This seems to
indicate that legislative intent was that the tax is to be paid out of the specific
52
property involved.
Without statutory authorization to charge the tax liability against policy
proceeds or benefits, companies are left in the position of arguing implied
authorization 1 53 to offset the tax due on generation-skipping transfers, against
policy proceeds. Such an implied authorization could only arise from either the
generation-skipping law itself or the contract. The equities in such an argument for pre-effective date policies would seem to be on the side of the insurance company since it could not, at the time of contract formation, have
anticipated that such a tax would be imposed. It would be unjust to require
the taxes to be paid without any contribution from the generation-skipping
trust equivalent. As to post-effective date policies, proponents might point to
the naturally slow process required to put into effect changes in policy lannumber of payment units due is paid to the annuitant. The principle of the variable annuity
is very similar to the purchase of units in mutual funds. See HUEBNER, supra note 43, at 12527.
148. See HUERNER, supra note 43, at 242; 2 INSURANcE LAW AND PRACtICE, supra note 146,
at §881; SMITH, supra note 87, at 13.
149. Id.
150. "Generally, it is anticipated that the tax will be paid out of the proceeds of the
trust property." H.R.

REP.,

supra note 3, at 57. Other than this statement, legislative commit-

tee reports give no indication of any thought given to this matter. See also Stephens &
Calfee, supra note 2, at 506-07.
151.

I.R.C. §2603(b).

152. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 57.
153. "Reformation of an insurance contract is equitable in nature, and therefore controlled by equitable principles." 17 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D §66.8 (2d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1976).
"Equity in a proper case may reform a written contract which, due to mutual mistake, does
not express the intention of the parties, but it can do so only to the extent of making the
contract speak the actual agreement. It cannot make a new and different contract for the
parties, .-. . reformation will not add a term as to which the parties have never reached any
agreement, for in such case the court would be making a new contract for the parties." Id.

§66.9.
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guage' 54 as a justification for policy offsets of the tax without express policy
authorization. Without allowance of some method of reimbursement the potential windfall to beneficiaries will be enormous. The development of judicial
views differing from state to state in regard to the right of reimbursement may
pose a serious problem for insurance companies. 155 Moreover, the costs of
litigating the problem in many different states may become excessive.
An analogous situation to the instant problem of obtaining a means
of reimbursement to the insurance companies is presented in cases dealing with the collection of estate taxes apportioned to insurance companies
holding proceeds under delayed settlement options.156 Although few states have
addressed the question, 157 the courts of New York, in ruling that the taxes may
be collected from the insurance company, have protected the insurance com58
panies by allowing the companies to reduce their liability under the policies.
If partial liquidation of proceeds through payments had already begun, the
companies were required to pay the taxes but were then allowed to recover
59
from beneficiaries the amounts attributable to already disbursed funds. The
154. Anytime a change in policy language is desired, the change must go through an unusually cumbersome process before an actual "new" policy can be issued. The change must
not only be written and approved by company attorneys, it must also be filed and/or approved by state insurance departments in every state where the policy is expected to be
written. The requirements of each state differ widely and each one may cause a considerable
delay before the policy may be written in that state. See MYmR, supra note 40, §§26.12-.13.
155. Each state may interpret the policy differently under their respective insurance laws.
A conflicts of laws question could also arise between states but discussion of any question in
that area is beyond the scope of this note. For more information about conflicts of laws see
MEYER, supra note 40, ch. 24; W. R.EsE AND M. RoSENaERG CONFLiCrs OF LAW 466-78 (7th ed.
1978).
156. See generally Note, Insurance Proceeds and Estate Tax Apportionment: The Florida

Dilemma, 29 U. FA. L. REv. 468 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Estate Tax Apportionment].
157. Only four states have confronted the problems inherent in an action by executors
against insurance companies for apportioned taxes. Those states are Florida, New Jersey, New
York and Pennsylvania. Id. at 476.
158. "If the insured has retained all the proceeds, it appears settled that the insurer is
required to pay the apportioned taxes from the proceeds and may reduce the proceeds payable
to the beneficiary accordingly. The courts have protected the insurance companies in these
circumstances by requiring the beneficiary to return his certificates of interest in order to
record the amounts paid by the insurance companies and properly indicate the reduction in
the insurer's liability under the policy." Id. at 477-78. See also In re Scott's Estate, 158 Misc.
481, 286 N.Y.S. 138 (Sur. Ct. 1936), aff'd, 249 App. Div. 542, 293 N.Y.S. 126 (1937), aff'd, 274
N.Y. 538, 10 N.E.2d 538, cert. denied sub nom., Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 302 U.S. 721 (1938); In re Estate of Singer v. Commissioner, 80
Misc. 2d 1006, 363 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sur. Ct. 1975); In re Estate of Klauber, 22 Misc. 2d 879, 195
N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sur. Ct. 1959); In re Stempler's Estate, 20 Misc. 2d 797, 192 N.Y.S.2d (Sur. Ct.
1959).
159. If the insurer has distributed part of the proceeds through a fixed payout settlement
option, the courts, while holding the insurer liable for taxes apportioned to the proceeds,
permit the taxes to be paid by the company from proceeds it holds, thereby reducing the
company's liability pro rata for each of the remaining payments, and to payments already
distributed. Taxes paid by the company that are attributable to payments already dispersed
may be recovered from the respective beneficiaries through cooperative beneficiaries or through
court action or the beneficiary may be primarily liable to pay those 'taxes himself. Estate Tax
Apportionment, supra note 156, at 479. See also In re Shea's Will, 63 Misc. 2d 741, 313
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approach of New York seems to be sound and will hopefully be applied to the
context of generation-skipping taxes. However, in view of the litigation costs
and potential for disparity of results between the states, statutory authorization,
either express or implied, would be preferable.
Collecting the Tax
The above discussion presumes that there is no prohibition against collecting the tax from the insurance company itself. Although collection of tax from
insurance companies has not been addressed in the generation-skipping area, it
has been in the estate tax area by some jurisdictions. In that area section 2206
of the Code specifically authorizes executors to collect taxes from life insurance
beneficiaries attributable to policy proceeds included in decedents' gross
estates. 160 However, when these proceeds are held by insurance companies
under settlement agreements, the problem becomes whether the taxes may be
recovered from the insurance company.' 6' Section 2206 of the Code is not ap62
plicable to collection of apportioned taxes from insurance companies.
Although few states have considered the question either legislatively or
judicially, of those that have only New York has firmly allowed recovery from
the company. 63 Of the others that have considered the problem, Florida and
Massachusetts have statutorily prohibited collection, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania
and District of Columbia have judicially prohibited collection and Kentucky
and New Jersey are unsettled. 6 4 If collection of the estate tax is found to be
analogous to collecting the generation-skipping tax, collection of tax from the
insurance company may present problems. One plausible argument in favor of
collection would be that the generation-skipping statute places personal liability on the trustee, who in the insurance trust equivalent is presumably the insurance company, whereas in the estate tax statute, the insurance company itself is never mentioned or even impliedly referred to.
Taxes Due After ProceedsLiquidation
Occasionally, insurance companies may be faced with taxable terminations
at a time when they are scheduled to make a lump sum distribution to the new
beneficiary. 16' In that situation, the statute states a preference for terminations
N.Y.S.2d 600 (Sur. Ct. 1970); In re Estate of Lipshie, 30 Misc. 2d 306, 213 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sur.
Ct. 1961); In re Estate of Klauber, 22 Misc. 2d 879, 195 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sur. Ct. 1959).
160. I.R.C. §2206.
161. Estate Tax Apportionment, supra note 156, at 468.
162. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Helvering, 128 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
163. Estate Tax Apportionment,supra note 156, at 470.
164. Id.
165. For example, an option paying interest to the grantor's son for his life and at his
death providing for distribution of the policy proceeds to grandchildren, would constitute a
lump sum distribution at the son's death. This incident triggers both a taxable termination
due to the termination of the son's interest and a taxable distribution because the corpus is
released to the grandchildren in the same year in which the son had been receiving income
benefits. In this situation only the taxable termination would be taxed as a generationskipping transfer. Other instances in which this might also occur would be upon the early
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over distributions.166 As a result, at the time that the insurance company is
expected to release all funds and remove itself from the beneficiary's financial
affairs, the company must determine and pay a tax as well as file the federal
return. As a result, most companies will delay payment until their liability has
been determined,1ar which may be a potentially lengthy process.168 While this
delay to the beneficiary may be unwelcome, it is only a small, part of the problem for the company-trustee. Under the statute, the tax imposed may be subject
to recalculation at a later date if the deemed transferor dies within three years
of the transfer.169 Such a recalculation will likely lead to an increase in tax.170
Given this possibility of future liability, few companies will be willing to release funds for up to three years after a transfer. This amount of delay will
certainly be protested by beneficiaries and may be deemed unreasonable by
courts.' 71 One must wonder whether a company that has released all funds is
intended to be held liable at some future date for a tax on proceeds it no
longer holds. It is arguable that since the statute provides a lien on the transferred property, this was not the intent of Congress.'172 Instead, it would seem
reasonable to assume that the liability was to follow the assets.
In the estate tax apportionment area, at least one state would hold that
the company would not be liable once it has released all of the policy proceeds.
The Court of Appeals of New York held in In re Zahn's Estate'"3 that an insurance company would not be liable for estate taxes attributable to proceeds
that had been distributed three years before approtionment was sought.

74

The

death of a beneficiary under a time option in which the contingent beneficiary is scheduled to
take the commuted value (see note 86 supra) of remaining payments for the period instead of
periodic distributions. See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
166. I.R.C. §2613(b)(7)(A). See text accompanying note 22 supra.
167. In the estate tax apportionment setting this delay is one argument against holding
the insurer liable for the tax. The reasoning is that such a delay defeats "one of the primary
advantages of life insurance- rapid liquidity for the beneficiary." Estate Tax Apportionment,
supra note 156, at 477.
168. See text accompanying notes 176-192 infra for a discussion of the variety of duties
placed upon the insurer/trustee that may cause prolonged delays.
169. I.R.C. §2602(e). See text accompanying note 32 supra.
170. If a deemed transferor dies after the transfer, forcing a recalculation under I.R.C.
§2602(e), the tax liability, if any, is likely to increase since the tax rate is based on the
deemed transferor's lifetime gifts and estate rather than on his lifetime gifts alone. ld.
§2602(a). Unless the deemed transferor's estate had no property at his death, the total
amount possibly subject to tax will be greater when the estate property is added.
171. Most states provide a penalty to be applied against insurance companies who
wrongfully withhold payment of claims. Whether the potential tax liability would be considered sufficient reason for delay in payment cannot be answered. For examples of typical
statutes addressing the penalties, see ARK. STAT. ANN. §66-3238 (1966); FLA. STAT. §627.427,
.428 (1977); GA. CODE ANN. §56-1206 (1977); KAN. STAT. §40-256 (1977).

172. See text accompanyin gnotes 151 & 152 supra.
173. 300 N.Y. 1, 87 N.E.2d 558 (1949).
174. In Zahn, apportionment was not sought until three years after distribution of the
proceeds when a reaudit of the estate included the proceeds in the estate for the first tax.
The executor paid the taxes and sued the insurance company for reimbursement upon finding
no hope of recovery from the beneficiary who had died in the interim in a destitute financial
condition. The duty of the insurance company in Zahn may be distinguishable from the duty
of an insurance company in a generation-skipping arrangement in that in the latter case the
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same principle of law might be applied in generation-skipping cases to allow
the tax liability to follow the proceeds in any situation in which the proceeds
have been released in good faith. 175
ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES

When a taxable generation-skipping transfer is found to have occurred, the
taxes to be paid are the most visible of costs involved. However, in addition to
the tax burden, the insurer must perform other duties including: (1) identifying and monitoring actual and possible generation-skipping arrangements for
the taxable events; (2) identifying deemed transferors and determining their
tax histories; (3) computation of the amount of the transfers and resultant tax;
(4) filing information returns. 7 6 The cost of performing these administrative
duties is potentially very large.
Identificationand Monitoring
The first task that must be undertaken by both insurance companies and
beneficiaries is to examine all existing settlement elections and supplementary
contracts 177 to determine if they involve generation-skipping trust equivalents.
For beneficiaries, this task is not overly burdensome since they are usually involved in only one or two contracts. On the other hand, for companies this task
will be more substantial. In order to identify these trust equivalents, the company must have on hand the following information: (1) Name and age of the
insured; (2) Age and relationship to insured of the first primary beneficiary;
(3) Age and relationship to insured and to the first beneficiary of any second
beneficiaries, third beneficiaries, etc. Some of this information will be available
in company files.' 7 8 Other information, such as the ages and relationships of
contingent beneficiaries may not be readily available. Many policies will have
the potential for becoming a trust equivalent but will not as yet constitute
one. 17 9 Thus, even after present policies are examined, the company must establish a system to monitor present and incoming policies and settlement selections. Policies will have to be examined for both their present status as trust
insurer is in the position of a trustee. As holder under the estate tax apportionment statutes,
the company did not have any duty to find out if the policy was includable in the estate or
to make sure the taxes were paid. As a trustee in a generation-skipping context, the company
not only has the duty to see if the payout constitutes a termination, but it also has the duty to
pay the tax due and is personally liable for any tax not paid.
175. This could be applied to both simultaneous distribution-terminations and posttransfer deemed transferor death situations. See also Stephens & Calfee, supra note 2, at
493-96.
176. See text accompanying notes 177-192 infra.
177. Supplementary contracts are entered into by an insurance company when a departure from the standard settlement option is agreed upon. See generally HUEBNER, supra
note 43, at 232; MEHR, supra note 39, at 219.
178. Companies will often have ages of beneficiaries on record since it is an essential
ingredient in determining the life expectancy of the beneficiary. The life expectancy is then
used to determine the amount that will be paid as periodic payments. See note 108 supra.
179. Any policy with a guaranteed choice of settlement options not subject to company
approval will have such a potential. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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equivalents and the occurrence of taxable events.18
involved in such a system will undoubtedly be large.

0

The administrative costs

The Deemed Transferor
Whenever taxable events do occur, the identity of the deemed transferor
and his tax history must be ascertained in order to determine the applicable
tax. 8 ' This information might be readily available to the beneficiary in the
case of a taxable distribution since he will usually be related to the deemed
transferor in some manner.1 8 2 On the other hand, this information will not
necessarily be readily available to the insurance company. Additionally, assuming that the identity of the deemed transferor can be determined with a
minimum of effort, 83 a major problem might still be presented in ascertaining
the tax history of that person. In the statute a trustee is specifically authorized
to ask for and rely upon rates furnished by the Secretary.8 4 If the deemed
transferor is deceased and his estate filed a return with the Secretary or if the
deemed transferor is alive, 8s it is reasonable to assume the Secretary will be
able to furnish the desired rates. However, if the deemed transferor has died
and his estate did not file a return, 86 the Secretary will not have the rates to
supply. Perhaps the statute will be interpreted as placing the burden on the
Secretary to prepare an estimate. If not, insurance company/trustees will be
faced with collecting tax history for that category of deemed transferors on its
own. 8 7 The costs of such an endeavor and the conceivable obstacles, such as
the potential refusal of executors and deemed transferors to cooperate, 8 8 impose a considerable burden on insurers.

180. In addition to monitoring policy transactions, companies may be charged as trustees
with the duty of notifying beneficiaries whenever taxable distributions occur. This would
seem reasonable since the company has a better view of the overall transaction than isolated
beneficiaries and may be better informed of the amount of distribution.
181. See text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 26 & 27 supra.
183. See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.
184. I.R.C. §2603(a)(2). See text accompanying note 25 supra.
185. Under I.R.C. §6019 a taxpayer must file a gift tax return in any year that he makes
a gratuitous transfer in excess of $3,000 per transferee per year (I.R.C. §2503(b)), other than
a qualified charitable transfer. As a result, the Secretary will be able to obtain a summary of
all the taxable gifts made by the deemed transferor.
186. I.R.C. §6018 only requires returns to be fied if an estate exceeds the statutory
amount. For decedents dying in 1977 through 1980, the statutory amounts are $120,000,
$134,000, $147,000, and $161,000, respectively. For decedents dying after 1980, returns will only
be required of estates in excess of $175,000.
187. It seems distributees who encounter uncooperative deemed transferors may be faced
with this problem even more since they are not authorized to request or rely on rates from
the Secretary.
188. The statute does not give any legal rights against the deemed transferor or his
representatives to those who need tax history of the deemed transferor. Thus, he may refuse
to cooperate with no penalty against him and no recourse to the trustee or distributee who
needs the information.
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Calculatingand Paying the Tax
Once the tax rate is determined and the taxable event has transpired, the
last steps of the administrative process can begin; the value of the transfer must
be determined8s9 and the actual tax calculated. 190 A return must then be prepared and, together with the tax payment, filed with the Internal Revenue
Service. Lastly, the deemed transferor must be observed for three years after
the transfer so that the tax may be recalculated and a new return filed in the
event of his death during that period.1 91 At this point there are no more requirements imposed on the distributee-beneficiary. But for the trustee/insurance company, the costs of litigation to obtain reimbursement for the tax may
still lie ahead. This may involve claims for reduction of the company liability
under the policy, recovery from beneficiaries for overpayments, both, or
92
neither.1
CONCLUSION

In view of the additional administrative and legal responsibilities created
by the new tax on generation-skipping transfers, it is reasonable to expect that
the costs of administration will be great. Certainly the costs will be far in excess
of what was contemplated by the parties when they executed the insurance contract. It seems an argument could be made for reformation of the policy contracts to allow a reduction for these additional administrative costs' 93 over and
above reimbursement for the tax itself.
Even when companies are allowed to adjust policies to offset these additional costs, the question still remains as to how they should be allocated. Conceivably, there are four levels of costs. The first involves monitoring all policies
that may become trust equivalents. 94 The second includes the costs of monitoring those policies that actually become trust equivalents for possible taxable
events. 95 Another arises in the actual administrative and legal work required
when the taxable event occurs. 96 And finally there is the tax itself. 9- All policies with a guaranteed choice of settlement options carry the risk of becoming
trust equivalents, but the vast majority of these will never become such. Thus,
instead of charging the first level of costs to all policies with the potential of
189. See text accompanying notes 107-131 supra for a discussion of alternative methods of
valuing transfers.
190. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra for an explanation of how to compute the
tax.
191. See text accompanying note 169 supra.
192. See text accompanying notes 146-159 supra.
193. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
194. See text accompanying notes 177-179 supra.
195. See text accompanying note 180 supra.
196. This would include determining if separate shares exist (see text accompanying
notes 97-106 supra), who the grantor is (see text accompanying notes 75-94 supra), the
amount of the transfer (see text accompanying notes 107-131 supra), the taxable year of the
trust (see text accompanying notes 132-138 supra), the identity of the deemed transferor (see
text accompanying notes 26-28 supra), the tax rate to be applied (see text accompanying note
30 supra), the tax due, and preparation and filing of the return (see text accompanying notes
30, 132 8- 133 supra).
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